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Abstract: This paper sets up a small open economy general equilibrium model operating in a mone-
tary union. Exogenous oil shocks that hit the modelled economy are alleviated by introduc-
ing a pro-cyclical excise duty tax rule on oil prices. It provides a model-based theoretical 
background for studying a fiscal response of curbing the negative effects of volatile global 
oil prices on inflation. Against this backdrop, we estimate the key parameters of the DSGE 
model and simulate different responses of the fiscal policy tax rule, based on different val-
ues of the responsiveness of the excise duty parameter.
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Introduction
Oil prices had always been a hot topic amongst policy makers as well as entrepreneurs 
and households. Fluctuations in oil prices have big effect on the economies and their 
monetary (and fiscal) policy activities as they can substantially affect the inflation rates 
and real output. Despite the importance of the oil-price shocks declined in the post-
1990 period, oil prices have risen in years following the outbreak of the financial crisis 
in the United States and the European Union. Only recently as prospects of a possible 
China cool-down in the economic activity forced oil prices to decline drastically and 
making new ground for further oil-shocks in the future. From the policy makers’ per-
spective, it is therefore essential to tackle this problem efficiently. In order to that, mon-
etary authorities are using complex dynamic macro models, such as DSGE models, 
trying to predict possible economy outcomes during oil-shock periods.
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Several studies have investigated the effect of oil-price shocks on the economy, 
and the role played by the monetary policy. The wide fluctuations in oil prices in 
recent years have spur new research agendas trying to assess the effects of oil price 
shocks. Despite the relatively small share in the overall consumption basket, these 
shocks can significantly affect households and firms’ decisions, the oil prices are 
quite volatile in comparison to other HICP components. In general, latest studies 
have used models to decompose direct effects of oil-price shocks on output and other 
economic variables, from those generated by the endogenous monetary policy re-
sponse (Hamilton 1983; Bernanke, Gertler and Watson 1997; Leduc and Sill 2001; 
Hamilton and Herrera 2004; Herrera and Pesavento 2007; Lippi and Nobili 2009; 
Anzuini, Pagano and Pisani 2013). However, studies applying the reduced-form co-
efficients in VAR-types of models make it difficult to disentangle the contribution of 
the monetary policy, and thus study oil shock effects in more detail. This can be done 
by developing more complex macroeconomic models, a characteristic that DSGE 
models have. Against this backdrop, a small open economy DSGE model is devel-
oped, following the works of Medina and Soto (2005), Hongzhi (2010), and Forni, 
Gerali, Notarpietro and Pisani (2012), where the difference between oil and non-oil 
goods explicitly modelled. Consistently with empirical evidence, the assumption is 
that crude oil is imported from the rest of the world by oil-importing firms and sold 
to domestic households. 
The contribution of the paper is the following. We follow a Medina and Soto 
(2005) type of model setting, but we refrain from it in two important aspects. First, 
we extend the model with a complete government spending block that provides a 
background for the implementation of the excise duty rule1. Doing this, the govern-
ment can offset the negative effects of oil shocks on inflation. 
And second, we try to fill the gap by studying the effects of oil shocks on a small 
open economy model integrated in a single monetary union, the euro area. Slovenia 
is a typical example based on the above-mentioned characteristics. It has no oil-pro-
ducing capacities; therefore all of its oil products are imported. It is strongly affected 
by the fluctuations in world prices of oil. Based on this, we estimate a small open 
economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. 
The structure of the model follows a standard New Keynesian framework with 
frictions such as Calvo pricing (1983) and Calvo wage setting equation introduced by 
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). 
For the purpose of simulating a single monetary union the euro area interest rate is 
modelled in a Taylor type rule setting (Taylor 1993) with the addition of a risk-premi-
um for the home interest rate that allows for deviations of the domestic interest rate 
from the euro area interest rate (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003). We assume that the 
domestic economy’s size is negligible, so its specific economic fluctuations have no 
influence on other euro area macroeconomic aggregates, such as the euro area GDP 
and prices.
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As commonly done in the DSGE literature, a number of parameters are calibrated 
from the outset, and are not included in the estimation process. However, some key 
structural parameters of the modelled economy are estimated following a Bayesian 
approach as in Smets and Wouters (2003), Adolfson et al. (2005), and Christoffel, 
Coenen and Warne (2008). With the estimated model we simulate how would main 
macroeconomic variables respond primarily to an oil-price shock.
The results show that global oil-price shocks can still have large effects on the 
Slovene economy. The fiscal policy authority has the power to offset the pressure that 
the oil price shocks have onto the overall inflation by counter-cyclically regulate the 
excise duty tax rate on oil products. However, this comes at a cost. Decreased tax in-
come decreases government spending and increases the budget deficit, if the govern-
ment chooses not to decrease its spending one to one with the decrease in tax income.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a concise struc-
ture of the DSGE model. Section 3 discusses the calibration, while Section 4 presents 
the results of the estimation. Section 5 provides impulse response functions and his-
torical decomposition. Section 6 concludes.
Model
Households
In the economy there is a continuum of households indexed by i Œ (0,1). In time t a 
household gains utility from consumption, Ct(i), and leisure, 1 – Lt(i). The i-th house-
hold’s therefore follows its lifetime utility function:
      (1)
where  and  present consumption and quantity of work effort of a particular house-
hold. The parameter Parameter 0 < b < 1 is the discount factor of household. We 
assume that households value the current consumption more than the future one. The 
parameter 0 < v < • is the inverse of the elasticity of work effort with respect to mar-
ginal disutility of labour (Frisch elasticity parameter). We allow for habit persistence 
in preferences by defining hCt-1(i), where 0 < h < 1 determines the degree of habit 
















We assume that households are the same, so Ct(i) = Ct holds. The consumption 
bundle of the i-th household is given by the following function
     (2)
where the variable OCt represents oil consumption, and the variable CCt represents the 
consumption of every other good. The parameter nOC is the elasticity of substitution 
between oil and non-oil consumption, while the parameter wOC is the share of oil in 
the overall consumption bundle. Further on, the consumption of every other good, CCt, 
or the so-called core consumption good, again represents an additional consumption 
bundle that is made of domestically produced goods and foreign imported goods. 
The core consumption bundle is then given by  
     (3)
where the parameter nFH is the elasticity of substitution between imported and do-
mestic good, while the parameter wFH is the share of imported goods in the core 
consumption bundle. Now we have all the ingredients to define demand functions for 
each type of good. The demands for oil and core consumption good are defined as
         (4)
and 
         (5)
The demands for foreign and home good are defined as
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and 
        (7)
where Pt, POt, PCt, PFt and PHt are prices for the respected consumption goods. Based on 
the consumption bundles we can define the overall inflation, Pt, as
      (8)
Analogous to the overall inflation, the core inflation, PCt, is given by
     (9)
Since households are identical ex ante, they face the same budget constraint in 
each period given by the expression:
  (10)
 
B*t denotes the holdings of one-period foreign (euro area) riskless bonds, while Bt 
denotes the holdings of one-period domestic bonds that can be issued by the home 
government. The nominal interest rates of bonds prevail at the time when the deci-
sion is taken, by R*t and Rt, respectively. Assuming the existence of a full set of con-
tingent bonds ensures that consumption of all households is the same, independently 
of the labour income they receive each period. The variable  denotes dividend profits 
of hoseholds from domestic firms. The variable Wt is the nominal wage set by a 
household, while TRt is the capita lump-sum net transfers from the government. The 
parameter tL is the income tax rate and is assumed to be fixed over time. On the 
opposite side we assume a time-varying value added tax on consumption, tCt.3 Each 
time a domestic household borrows from abroad it must pay a premium over the in-
ternational price of external bonds, denoted as Θ Bt* / PtX Xt( )  (Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe, 2003). In comparison to the Medina and Soto (2005) the parametrization of 
the function Q depends only of risk premium and not the nominal exchange rate as 
well. This is due to the fact, that we build a small open economy model operating in 
a monetary union. In the steady state, for Q holds
Ct





































Bt−1 i( )+ Bt−1* i( )+ 1−τ L( )Wt i( )Lt i( )+Π t i( )+TRt i( )− 1+τ tC( )PtCt i( )
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        (11)
The parameter !  is the elasticity parameter of the upward sloping supply of in-
ternational funds, while PX X is the steady state value of exports and B* stands for the 
steady state for net foreign asset position.
Labour is differentiated over households meaning that each household is a mo-
nopoly supplier of a distinct variety of labour service, which implies that the house-
holds can determine their own wage (Erceg, Henderson and Levin 2000; Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005). Applying the wage stickiness à la Calvo households 
sell their labour service to a firm, which then transforms the labour service into a 
homogeneous input good L using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
         (12)
where the parameter nL represents the elasticity of substitution between varieties of 
labour. Firms take the input price of the -th differentiated labour service as given, 
as well as the price of the homogeneous labour. The demand for labour is therefore 
defined as
          
(13)
where Wt(i) is the -th household’s wage, and Wt is the aggregate wage that is given by
         (14)
Since the households are a monopoly supplier of labour services, then each house-
hold also has some decision power over the wage it charges, Wt(i) . We assume that 
not all households can set its wages optimally in every period. A household receives 
a random wage-change signal at a constant probability, 1 – aL. In this case the house-
hold can set a new optimal wage, Wtopt(i). With probability, aL, other households up-
date their wage by indexation to the current numerarie inflation rate target, p-t, and 
previous period numeraire inflation rate, π tnum = Ptnum / Pt−1num . The household that 
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     (15)
where the parameter 0 < jL < 1 is the degree of wage indexation to the previous peri-
od inflation rate. On the other hand, the households that are able to re-optimize their 
wage, they face the following maximization problem
       (16)
where the expression Λt ,t+k = β Ct − hCt−1( ) / Ct+k − hCt+k−1( )  is discount factor of the 
relative consumption between the period and period t + k.
Firms
Domestic Good Firms
We have a continuum of representative domestic good firms indexed by  and are op-
erating in a monopolistic competition environment. They maximize their profits by 
choosing their optimal Calvo (1983) price of its product variety j. The corresponding 
demand and the technology is given by
    (17)
where YHt is the quantity of a particular variety of home good, while ZHt is a productiv-
ity shock in the home goods sector and is the same for all firms with the exogenous 
innovation eAt. The variables OHt  (j) and LHt  (j) are the oil input and labour input in 
the production process of a particular variety of home produced good. The parameter 
represenents the share of oil in the production process, while the parameter wOL is the 
elasticity of substitution between the oil and labour inputs.
From the first order condition, we can obtain the optimal mix of both production 
inputs, so that
         (18)
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Based on the minimization problem defined in the equation (17) we get the ex-
pression for the nominal marginal costs that depend on the prices of both production 
inputs and the productivity process
     (19)
Similarly as in the labour market sector, we assume that a fraction of firms 
(1 – aH) can reset their prices while the others aH set their price accordingly to the 
indexation rule (Calvo, 1983). If a firm receives the price-changing signal then it 
maximizes the optimal price Pt
H ,opt  
  (20)
subject to the demand of the variety of j product
        (21)
where the parameter nH denotes the price elasticity of the demand of a variety of j. 
The variable CtH,* is the foreign demand for home goods. The inflation variable pHt  is 
defined by home good prices PHt /PHt –1. The other firms set their price accordingly to 
the passive indexation rule
     (22)
where 0 < jH < 1 is the inflation indexation parameter. In the end we specify the 
profits that a -th firm follows
      (23)
Foreign Economy
The foreign economy consists of the demand for home produced goods4
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where the parameter wHF represents the share of the domestic intermediate goods 
in the consumption basket abroad, while n
H,*
 is the price elasticity of demand. The 
assumption is that domestic firms do not price discriminate across markets. Conse-
quently the law of one price holds, so that Pt
H ,* = Pt
H . Since the modelled small open 
economy operates in a monetary union the real exchange rate is just a relative price 
between foreign and home price index, so that
         (25)
In the real exchange rate we assume that the foreign consumption bundle does not 
include oil consumption, and that the size of w
FH,*
  is too small to affect the foreign 
inflation. Foreign inflation, however, is subject to a AR(1) process with the exogenous 
innovation etP*. Based on this we have to define the relative domestic price of oil. The 
expression is given by
         (26)
The variable t Ot corresponds to deviations from the law of one price in the relative 
oil price, due to excise duty tax on oil prices. Additionally the domestic relative oil 
price depends on the real exchange rate and the foreign relative oil price. The foreign 
price of oil PtO,* is subject to a AR(1) process with etPO,* being the exogenous innovation.
Government
The fiscal block follows the Almeida (2009) and Almeida et al. (2011) papers, but we 
add the extension of an excise duty tax rule. The government’s activity is based on the 
acquisition of the government’s consumption good, Gt, payment of debt, Rt−1 −1( )Bt, 
and household transfers, TRt. On the other side, the government finances itself by 
collecting value added tax, excise duty tax on oil consumption and income tax, 
τ tCPtCt +τ tOPtOOt +τ L
0
1
∫Wt i( )Lt i( )di , and debt issuance, Bt. The variables Gt and t Ct 
are modelled as AR(1) processes with et
G and et
tC being the respected exogenous inno-
vations. Government spending Gt also depends on t
0
t, so that 
        (27)
The intuition behind the equation (27) is to introduce the trade-off the govern-













F ,* 1+τ t
O( )
τ tCPtCt +τ tOPtOOt +τ L
0
1
∫Wt i( )Lt i( )di
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with respect to a decrease in its spending. Continuing, we get the government’s pri-
mary deficit
   (28)
We allow for the excise duty tax on oil consumption t 0t to vary over time so that
       (29)
This feature helps the fiscal part of the economy to curb the effects of the dynam-
ics of global oil prices, π tO,* = PtO,* / Ptnum , on the domestic economy via excise duty 
tax rule. Something similar was done by Jakab, Baksa and Benk (2010). However, 
they introduce a general tax rule based on the GDP gap. The idea behind it is that 
when oil prices rise the government decreases the excise duty on oil consumption in 
order to decrease the price pressure on the firms and households. On the other hand 
the lower excise duty tax income decreases the government spending and thus de-
creases the aggregate output. Adding interest outlays, we get the government’s total 
deficit
        (30)
The government’s budget constraint is defined by equalling government’s resourc-
es and expenditures, such that
   (31)
such that
          
(32)
In order to prevent explosiveness of the debt path a fiscal has to be imposed by re-
stricting DEftprim with endogenously adjusting TRt and ensuring that the debt-to-GDP 
ratio converges to a stable long-term value. The rule is given by 
        (33)
where B / gdp!  stands for the target value of the stationary debt-to-GDP ratio. The 
parameter ng is the government’s response parameter to the compliance of debt-to-
deft
prim = PtGt +TRt −τ tCPtCt −τ tOPtOOt −τ L
0
1
∫Wt i( )Lt i( )di
τ tO = ρττ t−1O − 1− ρτ( )γ Oπ tO,* + ε tτO
deft
tot = deft
prim + Rt−1 −1( )Bt
Bt+1 +τ tCPtCt +τ tOPtOOt +τ L
0
1
∫Wt i( )Lt i( )di = PtGt + Rt−1Bt +TRt
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GDP ratio. The idea behind the fiscal rule is that whenever the debt-to-GDP ratio 
rises above the target value, the transfers to households, TRt, automatically decrease 
in order to reduce the government’s expenditures and later on its deficit. 
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy interest rate is modelled as a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and de-
termines the interest rate for both economies operating in the monetary union
      (34)
et
MP represents an exogenous monetary policy shock. For the output gap we assume 
that foreign demand Ct* is large enough in comparison to the Slovene economy, so 
that the Slovene aggregate production would significantly affect both economies to-
gether. Foreign demand Ct* and inflation, pt*, is assumed to be exogenous AR(1) pro-
cesses with innovations etYF and etP, respectively.
Market Clearing
In the composite good market, supply of domestically produced good must satisfy 
the all types of demand
         (35)
The labour market implies that demand equals supply of labour
           
(36)
From the aggregate budget constraint of households we obtain an expression for 
the aggregate accumulation of international bonds
       
(37)
The total value of exports depends on the foreign demand for domestically pro-
duced goods
         (38)
Rt











































On the other hand the value of imports depends on the real exchange rate and the 
domestic demand for foreign goods and demand for oil and is given by
        (39)
where Ot = Ot
C +Ot
H  represents the total oil imports, comprised by household oil 
consumption and oil inputs in the home economy production process. We are left 
with the definition of the GDP, which is given then by
      (40)
Calibration of the Model
The key calibrated parameters are set with the intention of suiting the model as 
close as possible to the economy characteristics of interest - Slovenia, and at the 
same time are not of interest of the estimation process. The calibrated parameters 
are set according to already known empirical facts and national statistics data. 
The inverse of the elasticity of work effort (Frisch elasticity), v, is set to 1. The 
remaining parameters are: the discount factor, b, is set to 0.995, while the degree 
of habit persistence is h = 0.85. The target debt-to-GDP ratio, bˆ / gdp! , is set to 0.6, 
which is in-line with the Maastricht criteria. The other macro-related parameters 
relate to long-term averages and are set accordingly to the data from the Statistical 
Office of Republic of Slovenia (SORS). Government spending relative to the GDP 
is set to 17%, while net exports are set to 0.5%. The import share of goods in the 
consumption basket, wFH, takes the value of 0.5, while the share of oil in the total 
consumption basket, wOC, and the share of oil in the production process, wOL, take 
the value of 0.06. The Calvo wage parameter aH is set to 0.875, while the wage 
indexation parameter jH is set to 0.5. The elasticities of substitution between the 
same varieties of goods, nH, and labour, nL, are set to 11. Since Slovenia is a small 
open economy operating in a monetary union (i.e. without a significant effect on 
the monetary policy decision), we set the inflation and output interest rate response 
parameters to g p = 1.5 and gy = 0.1 (Taylor rule parameters), close to Fourçans and 
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Estimation and Results
In this subsection bayesian estimation results of the model are presented. The param-
eters of our interest are estimated with bayesian methods. Bayesian inference starts 
from setting out a prior distribution of the model’s parameters, which were not cali-
brated. In more detail, the prior distribution describes the available information prior. 
Then we observe the available statistical data in order to update the information prior 
with Bayes theorem, and obtain the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters. 
The dataset5 spanning from 2002Q1 to 2017Q3 in this process is comprised by Slo-
vene quarterly data: real GDP, real government spending, employment, excise duty 
tax rate, core inflation and HICP inflation. We add quarterly time series for the euro 
area real GDP as well. The original statistical series are not stationary; therefore, the 
stationarity of the data has to be imposed first by log-differentiating and demeaning 
of the data. The data enters the model as percent deviation from the steady state. The 
Metropolis-Hastings MCMC algorithm is used with 1.000.000 steps and two sequen-
tial chains with the acceptance rate per chain at a rate of 33.6%.
The results of the prior and posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and 
shocks are shown in Table 1. Looking at the estimation results, all the shocks are 
relatively persistent. The persistence parameters of shocks are denoted by parame-
ters r. Their values are mostly estimated to be between 0.65 and 0.8. While non of 
the shocks is excessively persistent, but are in-line with the existing literature (for 
example Forni et al., 2015; Smets and Wouters, 2003). The elasticities of substitu-
tion between oil and non-oil products, nOC, and factors, nOL, as expected exhibit low 
values, suggesting that oil is very inelastic. Inelasticity of oil is widely empirically 
documented (Miyazawa, 2009; Caldara, Cavallo and Iacoviello, 2016). What is more 
interesting is the estimate of the response parameter of excise duty tax rule, gO. It 
takes the value of 0.0964. If we consider the persistence parameter of the excise duty 
tax rule, rtO, than by simple algebra we can conclude that the government’s reaction 
to a 1 p.p. increase in global oil price, the excise duty tax rate decreases by 0.025 p.p.. 
More on the effects of oil shocks are presented in the next section where we analyse 
impulse response functions.
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Table 1: Prior and posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and shocks
Parameter Prior mode Posterior mode 90% HPD interval Prior distribution Posterior distribution
gO 0.1000 0.0964 0.0499 0.1419 beta 0.0300
g
G 0.1000 0.0929 0.0463 0.1371 beta 0.0300
nFH 1.0000 0.8492 0.7044 0.9904 gamma 0.1000
nOC 0.1000 0.0808 0.0419 0.1188 gamma 0.0300
nOL 0.1000 0.0956 0.0495 0.1408 gamma 0.0300
n
FH,* 1.0000 0.6922 0.5629 0.8171 gamma 0.1000
jH 0.7500 0.1659 0.0949 0.2329 beta 0.1000
aH 0.7500 0.7263 0.6536 0.8021 beta 0.1000
rP* 0.7500 0.7794 0.7213 0.8400 beta 0.0700
r
A 0.7500 0.7165 0.5623 0.8746 beta 0.1000
rPO,* 0.7500 0.6554 0.5002 0.8182 beta 0.1000
rYF 0.7500 0.7324 0.5745 0.8969 beta 0.1000
rtO 0.7500 0.7472 0.6024 0.8994 beta 0.1000
r
G 0.7500 0.7638 0.6188 0.9138 beta 0.1000
rtC 0.7500 0.7929 0.6508 0.9349 beta 0.1000
rr 0.7500 0.6999 0.6947 0.7049 beta 0.1000
eMP 0.4000 0.4019 0.3226 0.4796 inv. gamma 0.1000
eP* 0.5000 0.1341 0.1148 0.1529 inv. gamma 0.2000
e
A 0.7000 0.2147 0.1856 0.2432 inv. gamma 0.2000
epO,* 0.5000 0.3261 0.2205 0.4269 inv. gamma 0.2000
eYF 0.7000 0.2150 0.1863 0.2439 inv. gamma 0.2000
etO 0.5000 0.1192 0.1026 0.1352 inv. gamma 0.2000
e
G 1.0000 0.4093 0.3547 0.4615 inv. gamma 0.2000
etC 1.0000 0.4185 0.3625 0.4712 inv. gamma 0.2000
Source: author’s calculations
Impulse Response Functions and the Historical Shock Decomposition
Figure 1 shows the contributions of the exogenous shocks onto the overall inflation 
through time. It is evident, that the inflation in Slovenia was influenced by global oil 
price dynamics. During the 2006-2008 boom period in Slovenia the global oil prices 
positively contributed to the Slovene inflation as the global economy was in a large 
upswing. The Slovene inflation drastically decreased as the global financial crisis hit at 
the second half of the 2008. As the global economy rebounded from the first wave of 
the global financial crisis, so did the global oil prices as the again positively contributed 
to the Slovene inflation in 2010 and the beginning of 2011. The 2011 and 2012 were 
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characterised by the European sovereign crisis which affected the global demand for 
crude oil. This is shown by the negative contribution of oil shocks to the Slovene infla-
tion. The negative contribution of oil shocks continued in the next years as the global 
oil prices continued to fall in 2014 and 2015. Only with the start of 2016 the pattern of 
positive oil price shocks to the Slovene inflation emerged again, which is in line with 
the global oil price dynamics as the emerging economies increased the global demand.
Figure 1: Historical decomposition of oil and other shocks on inflation (y-o-y growth 
rate in percent)
* Note: The contribution of other shocks are the sum of the initial values and shocks eMP, eP, eA, epO,*, eYF, eG, and etC.
Source: author’s calculations
Going deeper into the analysis, the impulse response functions are depicted and 
assess how the key macroeconomic variables react to shocks induced to the modelled 
economy. In applied work namely, it is often of our interest to study the response of 
one variable to an exogenous impulse in another variable. Impulse response describes 
the evolution of the variable of interest along a specified time horizon after a shock 
in a given moment. The impulse responses of the exogenous shocks in the following 
figure depict a 30-period horizon. It is not, however, our objective to thoroughly anal-
yse the simulated economy’s impulse responses to all defined shocks, thus we limit 
the analysis to the response of macroeconomic variables only to the oil price shock 
and the shock to the tax rate of the excise duty on energy products.
According to our model, it seems that foreign oil price shocks can play a signifi-
cant role in driving the macroeconomic dynamics in Slovenia. To show the effect of 
changing global oil price dynamics, we analyse a 1 percentage point (p.p.) ex-ante 
increase in global oil prices. The effects of this shock are displayed in Figure 2, rep-
resenting the impulse responses of the main macroeconomic variables to the global 
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the Slovene inflation as the global economy was in a large upswing. The Slovene inflation 
drastically decreased as the global financial crisis hit at the second half of the 2008. As the 
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*Note: The contribution of other shocks are the sum of the initial values and shocks εMP, εP∗, εA, , 
εPO,∗, εYF, εG, and ετC.
Source: author’s calculations
Going deeper into the analysis, the impulse response functions are depicted and assess 
how the key macroeconomic variables react to shocks induced to the modelled economy. In 
applied work namely, it is often of our interest to study the response of one variable to an 
exogenous impulse in another variable. Impulse response describes the evolution of the 
variable of interest along a specified time horizon after a shock in a given moment. The 
impulse responses of the exogenous shocks in the following figure depict a 30-period horizon. 
It is not, however, our objective to thoroughly analyse the simulated economy's impulse 
responses to all defined shocks, thus we limit the analysis to the response of macroeconomic 
vari bles only to the oil rice shock nd the shock to the t x rate of the excise duty on energy 
products.
According to our model, it s ems th i n oil price shocks can play  sign ficant 
role in dr ving the macroeconomi  dynamics i  Slovenia. To show the effect of changing 
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oil price shock. The rise in global oil prices causes oil imports to decline for 0.1 p.p. 
from the steady state. On the other side the price of oil goods increases for 1 p.p., 
making the whole economy worse of as the aggregate output, consumption of all type 
of goods, overall imports, exports, labour and wages decrease. At the same time the 
inflation increases marginally as it mostly depends on the weight of oil goods in the 
inflation basket. Comparing the impulse responses of the oil shock to the existing 
literature, it closely matches the responses to a negative oil shock done by Forni et 
al. (2015) as they estimated the effect of the oil shock to the euro area economy. The 
excise duty tax rate on oil products immediately decreases as the government acts 
counter-cyclically to the dynamics of global oil prices. 
Figure 2: Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. foreign oil 
price shock (deviations from steady state)
Source: author’s calculations
Figure 3 represents the impulse represents the impulse responses of the macro-
economic variables to a 1 p.p. increase of the excise duty tax rate on oil prices. By 
doing this we show the effects of the government’s decision of raising the excise duty 
tax rate on the economy. As expected the increase in the excise duty tax rate on oil 
products has similar effects as the global oil price shocks – the cost-push type shocks. 
The inflation increases, as well as the domestic oil prices. On the other side the aggre-
gate output, consumption, exports, imports, wages and labour decrease. 
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global oil price dynamics, we analyse a 1 percentage point (p.p.) ex-ante increase in global oil 
prices. The effects of this shock are displayed in Figure 2, representing the impulse responses 
of the main macroeconomic variables to the global oil price shock. The rise in global oil 
prices causes oil imports to decline for 0.1 p.p. from the steady state. On the other side the 
price of oil goods increases for 1 p.p., making the whole economy worse of as the aggregate 
output, consumption of all type of goods, overall imports, exports, labour and wages decrease. 
At the sa e time the inflati n increases m rgin lly as it mostly depends the weight of oil 
goods in the inflation basket. Comparing the impulse responses of the oil shock to the existing 
literature, it closely matches the responses to a negative oil shock done by Forni et al. (2015) 
as they estimated the effect of the oil shock to the euro area economy. The excise duty tax rate 
on oil products immediately decreases as the government acts counter-cyclically to the 
dynamics of global oil prices. 
Figure 2: Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. foreign oil price shock 
(deviations from steady state) 
Source: author’s calculations
Figu e 3 represents the impulse repr sents the impulse responses of the 
macroecon mic variables to a 1 p.p. increase of the excise duty tax rate on oil prices. By 
doing this we show the effects of the government’s decision of raising the excise duty tax rate 
on the economy. As expected the increase in the excise duty tax rate on oil products has 
similar effects as the global oil price shocks – the cost-push type shocks. The inflation 
increases, as well as the domestic oil prices. On the other side the aggregate output, 
consumption, exports, imports, wages and labour decrease.  
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. excise duty 
tax on oil prices shock (deviations from steady state)
Source: author’s calculations
Against this backdrop we provide different scenarios by changing the value of the 
excise duty tax parameter. Having obtained the estimated values of the model param-
eters we continue with a comparison of the impulse responses of the main macroeco-
nomic variables by fixing all the parameters to an estimated value and changing the 
value of the excise duty tax parameter parameter gO. The solid line in Figure 4 rep-
resents the responses of the variables when gO is set to the estimated value of 0.0964. 
The dashed line represents the responses of the variables when gO is calibrated to 0 
and the dotted line represents the responses of the variables when gO is calibrated to 
1. This way we provide two different calibrated values of the excise duty tax rate pa-
rameter gO. The distinction of implementing the excise duty tax rule is evident in our 
case. If an excise duty tax rule is taking place in the economy, the government’s fiscal 
policy is able to steer the increase of global oil prices away from the overall inflation. 
The harder the government tries to offset the oil price shock, the better it is for the 
economy inflation-wise. Oil price shocks have less negative effect on real wages and 
employment of households, since the inflation rises less than in the absence of the 
counter-cyclical excise duty tax rule. Consequently real consumption of every type 
decreases less in the case of more aggressive fiscal accommodation of the excise duty 
tax parameter (gO = 1). The same applies for aggregate real output, exports and im-
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. excise duty tax on oil 
prices shock (deviations from steady state) 
Source: author’s calculations
Against this backdrop we provide different scenarios by changing the value of the 
excise duty tax parameter. Having obtained the estimated values of the model parameters we 
continue with a comparison of the impulse responses of the main macroeconomic variables by 
fixing all the parameters to an estimated value and changing the v lue of the excise duty tax 
parameter parameter 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂. The solid line in Figure 4 represents the responses of the variables 
when 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂 is set to the estimated value of 0.0964. The dashed line represents the responses of 
the variables when 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂 is calibrated to 0 and the dotted line represents the responses of the 
variables when 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂 is calibrated to 1. This way we provide two different calibrated values of 
the excise duty t x rate param ter 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂. The distinction of implementing the exc se duty tax rule 
is evident in our case. If an excise duty tax rule is taking place in the economy, the 
government’s fiscal policy is able to steer the increase of global oil prices away from the 
overall inflation. The harder the government tries to offset the oil price shock, the better it is 
for the economy inflation-wise. Oil price shocks have less negative effect on real wages and 
employment of households, since the inflation rises l ss than in the absence of the counter-
cyclical excise duty tax rule. Consequently real consumption of every type decreases less in 
the case of more aggressive fiscal accommodation of the excise duty tax parameter (𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂 = 1).
The same applies for aggregate real output, exports and imports. But everything comes at a 
cost. If the government aggressive enough (i.e. 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂 = 1), it has to increase its deficit in order 
to offset the negative oil shocks.  
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ports. But everything comes at a cost. If the government aggressive enough (i.e. gO= 
1), it has to increase its deficit in order to offset the negative oil shocks. 
Figure 4: Impulse responses of the inflation variables to a 1 p.p. foreign oil price shock 
with changing government excise duty parameter (deviations from steady state)
Source: author’s calculations
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of the inflation variables to a 1 p.p. foreign oil price shock with 
changing government excise duty parameter (deviations from steady state) 
Source: author’s calculations
Conclusion 
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Conclusion
In this paper an estimated DSGE model is presented for the Slovene economy. The 
contribution of the paper is filling the gap by studying the effects of oil shocks on a 
small open economy model setting integrated in a single monetary union, the euro 
area, and introducing a concise government sector with excise duty tax rule for oil 
related products. The structure of the model is set in a typical small open economy 
fashion, where firms and households are assumed to adjust prices and wages, re-
spectively, à la Calvo. The different composition of the goods bundle allows for the 
changing demands of different types of goods that are affected by different price 
setting. By using bayesian inference methodology the key parameters of interest are 
estimated. 
The results show that global oil-price shocks can still have large effects on the 
Slovene economy. The fiscal policy authority has the power to offset the pressure that 
the oil price shocks have onto the overall inflation by counter-cyclically regulate the 
excise duty tax rate on oil products. However, this comes at a cost. Decreased tax in-
come decreases government spending and increases the budget deficit, if the govern-
ment chooses not to decrease its spending one to one with the decrease in tax income.
NOTES
1  Excise duty is a tax on consumption. In Slovenia, the system and obligation of paying the excise 
duty are regulated by the Excise Duty Act which is harmonized with the EU legislation. It was first 
introduced on July 1st 1999. The excise duty in Slovenia is payable for the following goods released 
for consumption in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia: alcohol and alcoholic beverages, tobacco 
products, energy products and electricity (Ministry of Finance, 2016; Ministry of Finance, 2017). The 
government can act counter-cyclical to the dynamics oil prices and accommodate the level of the ex-
cise duties on oil prices in order to decrease the pressure on the overall inflation.
2  All shocks in the model follow an exogenous AR(1) process given by the following representation 
ζ t = 1− ρζ( )η + ρζζ t−1 + εtζ , where εtζ ∼ i.i.d ., 0,σζ2( ) .
3  Following Almeida (2009) we set Pt
num = 1+τ tC( )Pt  as the numeraire for converting nominal vari-
ables to real. It is the after tax price of private consumption good.
4  For simplicity reasons we leave out the exportable commodity good sector, which is defined in Me-
dina and Soto (2005) alongside the foreign demand for home produced good.
5  Sources: Eurostat, SORS and ECB.
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